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Abstract 
Motivated by regulators’ concerns about non-GAAP financial measures and building on 
research that finds more informative disclosures allow current stock returns to better 
reflect future earnings, I examine whether non-GAAP earnings exclusions enhance or 
garble the future earnings news captured in current stock returns.  Utilizing a novel data 
collection technique using Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), I collect non-GAAP 
earnings data from 2003 to 2012 and measure managers’ non-GAAP exclusions relative 
to three comparable earnings: (1) GAAP earnings before extraordinary items, (2) GAAP 
earnings from operations, and (3) analyst-adjusted “street earnings.” I find a negative 
association between the magnitude of managers’ non-GAAP exclusions and the extent to 
which current returns reflect future earnings information.  Additional tests reveal this 
negative association is due to income-increasing exclusions.  I find similar results using 
the association between current returns and either future earnings from operations or 
future non-GAAP earnings. I also provide evidence of increased garbling of future 
earnings news when managers use incremental non-GAAP exclusions to meet or beat the 
consensus earnings forecast.  Finally, I find that consistent non-GAAP reporting is 
associated with more future earnings information reflected in current stock returns. 
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1. Introduction 
The disclosure of non-GAAP financial measures has received considerable 
attention from various parties including the business press, regulators, investors and 
academics.  The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) provided additional 
guidance on non-GAAP reporting by updating its Compliance and Disclosure 
Interpretations in May 2016 and non-GAAP financial measures have become the second 
most frequent topic of SEC comment letters (Ernst & Young 2016).  Former SEC Chair 
Mary Jo White recently stated that “non-GAAP measures are used extensively and, in 
some instances, may be a source of confusion” (White 2015).  After the SEC issued the 
additional guidance, she said “we are watching this space very closely and are poised to 
act through the filing review process, enforcement and further rulemaking if necessary” 
(White 2016).1  A primary concern of regulators is protecting investors, a sentiment 
expressed by James Schnurr, former SEC Chief Accountant, who recently said “the rules 
are clear that non-GAAP measures must not be misleading” (Schnurr 2016). 
The purpose of this study is to examine whether non-GAAP earnings disclosures 
enhance or garble the future earnings information captured in current stock returns.  I 
examine investors’ expected future earnings based on the association between current 
stock returns and future earnings and test whether this association is impacted by the 
magnitude and direction of exclusions made by managers in calculating non-GAAP 
earnings.  This research design allows me to directly address regulators’ concerns that 
non-GAAP earnings disclosures may be confusing or misleading investors.  Prior 
                                               
1 Several articles in the business press reference these and other comments made by SEC Chair White in 
regards to non-GAAP reporting (e.g., Francis and Linebaugh 2015, Teitelbaum 2015, Michaels and 
Rapoport 2016). 
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research finds that investors respond to the information contained in non-GAAP earnings, 
evidenced by a stronger association between contemporaneous stock returns and 
non-GAAP earnings than GAAP earnings (Bradshaw and Sloan 2002; Bhattacharya et al. 
2003; Brown and Sivakumar 2003).  However, it is predominantly less sophisticated 
investors that trade on non-GAAP earnings information (Frederickson and Miller 2004; 
Elliott 2006; Allee et al. 2007; Bhattacharya et al. 2007).  It is not clear whether investors 
are confused by non-GAAP earnings disclosures. I build on this literature by examining 
how non-GAAP earnings disclosures affect investors’ ability to incorporate future 
earnings news into current prices.2 
Predicting future earnings is an important valuation use of accounting 
information.  Nichols and Wahlen (2004) succinctly explain the relation between earning 
information and equity valuation: Information in current earnings is used to predict future 
earnings, which then determine expected future dividends.  Stock price, in turn, reflects 
the discounted expected future cash flows (future dividends) of the firm.  Current 
earnings’ ability to predict future earnings is one aspect of earnings quality, with earnings 
that reveal more information about future earnings considered higher quality (Dechow et 
al. 2010).  Prior research also suggests that more informative disclosures allow current 
returns to better reflect future earnings (Lundholm and Myers 2002; Tucker and Zarowin 
2006; Orpurt and Zang 2009; Choi et al. 2011).  I examine an unexplored aspect of the 
quality of non-GAAP earnings disclosures by testing whether non-GAAP exclusions 
influence the extent to which current stock returns reflect future earnings news. Stated 
                                               
2 I recognize that there are other non-GAAP measures reported by firms such as funds from operations or 
EBITDA, but choose to focus my research question on the disclosure of non-GAAP earnings as earnings 
are the most common non-GAAP disclosure and the summary accounting measure. 
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differently, I examine the impact of non-GAAP exclusions on investors’ expectations of 
future earnings. 
The extant non-GAAP literature predominantly uses earnings persistence to 
measure the quality of non-GAAP earnings.  These studies find that items excluded in 
calculating non-GAAP earnings are not completely transitory and that different factors 
(e.g., regulation, board independence, investor sentiment) affect the persistence of 
non-GAAP exclusions (Gu and Chen 2004; Kolev et al. 2008; Frankel et al. 2011; Brown 
et al. 2012).  However, the persistence of non-GAAP exclusions and the impact of 
non-GAAP disclosures on investors’ ability to predict future earnings news (as captured 
by stock returns) are two important yet distinct measures of the quality of non-GAAP 
earnings.  Investors may recognize that non-GAAP exclusions are not fully transitory and 
incorporate this information into their prediction of future earnings, but this recognition 
by investors is ignored using a persistence model.  By examining the association between 
non-GAAP exclusions and investors’ expectation of future earnings, I am able to directly 
addresses regulators’ concern that non-GAAP disclosures confuse investors.  
Additionally, if reported non-GAAP earnings information can be combined with other 
information to better predict future earnings, this indirect use of non-GAAP earnings in 
predicting future earnings will not be captured by measuring earnings persistence, but 
will be impounded in current stock price.  Thus, I use the relation between current stock 
returns and expected future earnings to capture investors’ direct and indirect use of 
non-GAAP earnings information in predicting future earnings news. 
Managers view non-GAAP earnings as one of the most important measures they 
disclose (Graham et al. 2005) and claim that the information contained in non-GAAP 
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earnings is useful to investors for both assessing current performance and forecasting 
future performance (Francis and Linebaugh 2015).3 Critics, on the other hand, argue that 
non-GAAP disclosures are opportunistically reported to distort the firm’s true 
performance (Rapoport 2016).  If managers use disclosure of non-GAAP earnings to 
convey information about future earnings to investors, that information should be 
reflected in current stock returns.  Alternatively, if managers use non-GAAP exclusions 
to garble future earnings news, less information about future earnings will be reflected in 
current stock returns.   
I use a novel technique to collect non-GAAP earnings data from earnings 
announcement press releases.  After programmatically identifying tables within the 
earnings announcements that contain non-GAAP words or phrases, I paid workers on 
Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) to identify the non-GAAP earnings per share from 
these tables.  Section 4.2 details this process, which resulted in 7,010 firm-year 
observations from 2003 to 2012 used to conduct my main analyses. 
To test whether managers’ non-GAAP exclusions influence the association 
between current returns and future earnings news, I use a future earnings response 
coefficient (FERC) model based on  Collins et al. (1994), as implemented by Lundholm 
and Myers (2002), Tucker and Zarowin (2006), Orpurt and Zang (2009), Choi et al. 
(2011), and Drake et al. (2015).  The FERC represents the future earnings information 
that is reflected in current stock returns.  I measure the magnitude of firm’s non-GAAP 
exclusions by comparing non-GAAP earnings to three different comparable earnings 
                                               
3 The 2016 Q2 earnings announcement of Alphabet (Google) provides an example of how managers 
describe the benefit of non-GAAP financial measures: “We believe that both managers and investors 
benefit from referring to these non-GAAP financial measures in assessing our performance and when 
planning, forecasting and analyzing future periods.” (emphasis added) 
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values: (1) GAAP earnings before extraordinary items, (2) GAAP earnings from 
operations, and (3) analyst-adjusted “street earnings” within each industry-year.   
I find that the association between current returns and future earnings becomes 
weaker as the magnitude of non-GAAP exclusions increases, consistent with managers’ 
larger non-GAAP exclusions garbling future earnings information.  Prior research 
suggests that the direction of managers’ non-GAAP exclusions is important.  The 
majority of non-GAAP exclusions are income-increasing (resulting in non-GAAP 
earnings that are higher than GAAP earnings), but income-decreasing exclusions are 
more transitory on average, consistent with informative managerial motives (Baumker et 
al. 2014; Curtis et al. 2014).  Supporting concerns from regulators and the business press 
focused on non-GAAP earnings that exceed GAAP earnings, I find the results are driven 
by income-increasing non-GAAP exclusions.  Hirshleifer and Teoh's (2003) limited 
attention theory suggests that non-GAAP earnings will be less informative when 
managers have greater incentives to increase the current stock price.  I expect that these 
managerial stock price incentives are strongest when non-GAAP exclusions are used to 
meet or beat an earnings benchmark.  Consistent with this theory, I find an incrementally 
lower FERC when non-GAAP earnings just meet or beat the consensus analyst forecast 
(by $0.02 or less) while “street earnings” fall short of the consensus forecast.   
In robustness tests, I replace future GAAP earnings before extraordinary items 
with either future GAAP earnings from operations or future non-GAAP earnings and find 
similar results.  To address the concern that firms with larger non-GAAP exclusions have 
less predictable future earnings due to other firm characteristics, I create a matched 
sample based on a firm’s propensity to disclose larger non-GAAP exclusions and find 
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consistent results using this sample.  Collectively, the results suggest that larger 
differences between non-GAAP and GAAP earnings are associated with garbling of 
future earnings news.  However, I also find evidence that firms consistently reporting 
non-GAAP earnings have a stronger association between current returns and future 
earnings.  This suggests that consistent reporting of non-GAAP earnings can help convey 
information to market participants rather than non-GAAP earnings always garbling future 
earnings news. 
This study makes two main contributions.  First, I inform the debate of whether 
non-GAAP earnings confuse investors by providing evidence that larger non-GAAP 
exclusions are associated with less future earnings news being reflected in current stock 
returns.  These results suggest that larger adjustments made by managers make prediction 
of future earnings more difficult for investors.  Regulators have expressed concern that 
non-GAAP disclosures may confuse investors and have suggested that additional 
regulation for non-GAAP reporting may be necessary.  The FERC model used in this 
study directly measures investors’ ability to predict future earnings information, 
providing a more direct response to regulators’ concern about whether investors are 
misled by non-GAAP earnings disclosures.  The findings of this study suggest that 
regulators’ concerns about non-GAAP financial measures are warranted, especially when 
managers use large income-increasing exclusions in calculating non-GAAP earnings. 
 Second, I add to the non-GAAP academic literature by measuring a component 
of non-GAAP earnings quality that has been largely ignored until now—the extent to 
which non-GAAP earnings disclosures reveal information to investors about future 
earnings. Prior research predominantly uses earnings persistence to measure the quality 
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of non-GAAP earnings.  However, the characteristics of firms that disclose non-GAAP 
earnings indicate that earnings persistence may be an inappropriate measure of earnings 
quality for this group of firms.  Firms that disclose non-GAAP earnings have more 
frequent losses (Marques 2006) and losses have very low persistence (Basu 1997).  
Non-GAAP disclosing firms also have higher growth and market-to-book ratios 
(Bhattacharya et al. 2004; Lougee and Marquardt 2004; Marques 2006; Bentley et al. 
2016), indicating higher levels of future good news that may not be captured in current 
earnings.  Dechow et al. (2010) state that persistence is a poor measure of earnings quality 
for growth firms.  Thus, a stock return-based measure of the extent to which non-GAAP 
earnings disclosures reveal information about future earnings helps give a more complete 
view of non-GAAP earnings quality.  
The findings of this study should be interpreted with caution for a few reasons.  
First, the FERC model assumes market efficiency.  If markets do not efficiently 
incorporate all relevant information (including information provided by non-GAAP 
earnings disclosures), the interpretation of my findings is not clear.  Second, even with 
the results using my propensity score matched sample, I cannot eliminate the possibility 




2. Background & Related Literature 
2.1 Non-GAAP Regulatory Background 
The SEC has addressed concerns over non-GAAP reporting in several ways over 
the past decade and a half.  On December 4, 2001, the SEC issued a cautionary statement 
about the reporting of non-GAAP financial information to alert investors of the potential 
dangers of relying on non-GAAP measures that could distort a firm’s GAAP results (SEC 
2001).  The statement warned investors that non-GAAP measures may not be comparable 
across firms and suggested that a GAAP loss presented as a non-GAAP profit may 
deceive investors, especially when no clear explanation of the exclusions is given.   
In compliance with section 401(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), the SEC 
issued Regulation G, which became effective on March 28, 2003 (SEC 2003).  Regulation 
G requires that firms provide (1) equal or greater prominence of GAAP measures relative 
to non-GAAP financial measures, (2) reconciliation of non-GAAP financial measures to 
the most comparable GAAP measure, and (3) explanation of the reasons management 
believes the non-GAAP financial measures are informative to investors.   
In conjunction with Regulation G, the SEC amended Item 10 of Regulation S-K 
and Item 10 of Regulation S-B to contain similar requirements.  These amendments 
included a prohibition of adjusting non-GAAP measures to “eliminate or smooth items 
identified as non-recurring, infrequent or unusual” when the items are reasonably likely 
to occur within two years or were reported in the prior two years.  In January 2010, the 
SEC issued a Compliance and Disclosure Interpretation to address questions relating to 
non-GAAP financial measure disclosures, which was subsequently updated in July 2011 
and May 2016 (SEC 2016).  These updates clarified that recurring items can be excluded 
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from non-GAAP measures if they are not described as non-recurring and all other 
disclosure requirements were met.  The May 2016 update also introduced several general 
interpretations about misleading non-GAAP measures.  Former SEC Chair Mary Jo 
White has stated that “non-GAAP measures are used extensively and in some instances 
may be a source of confusion” (White 2015) and even suggested that more regulation 
may be necessary for non-GAAP reporting (Michaels and Rapoport 2016; White 2016).4 
2.2 Non-GAAP Literature 
Early studies in the non-GAAP literature find that investors respond to non-GAAP 
earnings, evidenced by higher ERCs and R-squared values relative to GAAP earnings 
when examining the returns-earnings relation both over an entire quarter and in the 3-day 
window around the earnings announcement (Bradshaw and Sloan 2002; Bhattacharya et 
al. 2003; Brown and Sivakumar 2003).  Subsequent studies find that the value relevance 
and information content of non-GAAP earnings is greater when GAAP earnings are less 
informative (Lougee and Marquardt 2004), and that firms with less value relevant GAAP 
earnings place more emphasis on non-GAAP earnings (Bowen et al. 2005).5  Other 
studies indicate that it is predominantly less sophisticated investors who trade on 
non-GAAP earnings (Frederickson and Miller 2004; Elliott 2006; Allee et al. 2007; 
Bhattacharya et al. 2007).  Using data from the pre-Regulation G period, Doyle et al. 
(2003) find evidence that investors do not fully incorporate the future cash flow 
information contained in analyst-adjusted “street earnings” at the time of the earnings 
                                               
4 The SEC is not alone in expressing concerns about non-GAAP reporting.  The International Organization 
of Securities Commissions issued a cautionary statement about non-GAAP measures in 2002 followed by 
a proposed statement with expectations for presentation of non-GAAP financial measures in 2014.   
5 Lougee and Marquardt (2004) define GAAP earnings informativeness based on high-tech industry 
membership, intangible intensity, sales growth, leverage, earnings volatility, and the existence of special 
items. 
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announcement.6 Although there is evidence that investors respond to non-GAAP earnings 
disclosures, a key unanswered question in this literature is whether investors are misled 
or informed by these non-GAAP earnings disclosures (Berger 2005; Christensen 2007).   
Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) present a theoretical model in which some investors 
have limited attention and show that managers will opportunistically report non-GAAP 
earnings that are higher than GAAP earnings, which results in an upward bias in stock 
prices.  On the other hand, they show that if managers’ long-term reputational concerns 
outweigh their preference for higher current stock prices, then non-GAAP earnings will 
inform investors about managers’ true expected future cash flows of the firm.  Thus, 
theory does not clearly predict whether non-GAAP earnings disclosures will provide 
more or less information to investors about future earnings.  This question is important to 
the debate surrounding non-GAAP earnings because managers claim non-GAAP 
earnings are informative and useful to investors while critics argue that non-GAAP 
earnings are manipulated to mask the firm’s true financial performance.  Several different 
approaches have been used in the non-GAAP literature to examine managers’ motives 
for providing non-GAAP earnings. These approaches include using the persistence of 
non-GAAP earnings and exclusions to measure earnings quality, examining choices 
related to the inclusion or exclusion of specific items in non-GAAP earnings, and 
analyzing non-GAAP reporting behaviors that are deemed aggressive. 
2.2.1 Persistence of Non-GAAP Earnings and Exclusions 
Many of the studies that comment on the debate over managers’ motives for 
providing non-GAAP earnings examine the persistence of exclusions as a measure of the 
                                               
6 In untabulated analysis, I do not find any evidence of mispricing based on non-GAAP exclusions in my 
sample period. 
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quality of non-GAAP earnings.  Transitory exclusions, which are less likely to persist 
into future earnings, are considered higher quality under the assumption that managers 
intending to inform through non-GAAP reporting would exclude only transitory items 
when calculating non-GAAP earnings.  Managers that exclude permanent items in 
calculating non-GAAP earnings are therefore assumed to be acting opportunistically with 
the intent to mask their firm’s true performance.   
Early studies find that non-GAAP exclusions persist and are negatively related to 
both future cash flow from operations (Doyle et al. 2003) and future earnings (Gu and 
Chen 2004), but do not discuss whether the results suggest informative or opportunistic 
motives for non-GAAP disclosure.7  Doyle et al. (2003) find that this association is 
attributable to the exclusion of other items, and not the exclusion of special items.  Kolev 
et al. (2008) examine the quality of non-GAAP exclusions before and after SEC 
intervention via Regulation G, using the persistence of exclusions as a measure of quality 
and opportunism.  They find that non-GAAP exclusions are less persistent following 
Regulation G and conclude that the quality of non-GAAP earnings has improved, 
consistent with non-GAAP earnings becoming more informative.  More recent studies 
examine the impact of different monitoring environments on the quality of non-GAAP 
earnings, finding more persistent (lower quality) exclusions for firms with higher investor 
sentiment (Brown et al. 2012) or less independent boards of directors (Frankel et al. 2011) 
and less persistent (higher quality) exclusions following debt covenant violations 
                                               
7 Burgstahler et al. (2002) examine the persistence of special items and find that special items, like other 
non-GAAP exclusions are not completely transitory.  However they find that stock prices appear to reflect 
the information in special items that relates to future earnings. Doyle et al. (2003), on the other hand, find 
that investors do not fully incorporate the future cash flow implications of non-GAAP exclusions at the 
time of the earnings announcement, indicating that they may be misled by non-GAAP earnings. 
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(Christensen et al. 2015).  While prior research identifies different settings where the 
persistence of non-GAAP exclusions changes, there is limited evidence of whether 
investors are misled by these non-GAAP exclusions.  I add to this literature by using a 
measure of non-GAAP earnings quality which incorporates how investors’ expectations 
of future earnings are impacted by non-GAAP exclusions. 
2.2.2 Inclusion or Exclusion of Specific Items 
 Several studies examine non-GAAP reporting decisions related to specific 
expenses or gains.  One benefit of these studies is identifying whether the decision is 
attributable to informative or opportunistic motivations.  On the other hand, these studies 
are relatively narrow and their conclusions may not be generalizable to broader 
non-GAAP reporting settings.  Riedl and Srinivasan (2010) compare the persistence of 
special items presented as a separate line item in the income statement and special items 
disclosed in a footnote.  They find that special items presented as a separate line item are 
less persistent, consistent with informative disclosure motives.8  Barth et al. (2012) 
examine the exclusion of stock-based compensation expense by both analysts and 
managers.  Their findings are consistent with informative exclusion of stock-based 
compensation by analysts but opportunistic exclusion by managers.  
 Other studies examine the non-GAAP treatment of transitory gains.  Transitory 
gains provide an interesting setting where exclusion is considered informative because 
the gain is not recurring and exclusion results in non-GAAP earnings that are lower than 
                                               
8 Income statement line item disclosure is considered more salient than footnote disclosure and special 
items are assumed to be transitory.  Therefore, informative disclosure would be for special items disclosed 
as a line item on the income statement to be more transitory.  Alternatively, opportunistic disclosure would 
be for managers to disclose more permanent special items as an income statement line item where they 
would be presumed to be transitory. 
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GAAP earnings, contrary to managers’ preference for reporting higher non-GAAP 
earnings.  Baumker et al. (2014) find that while 88.5 percent of firms with one-time gains 
from legal settlements or insurance recoveries mention the gain and 85.8 percent provide 
its dollar amount, only 34 percent report non-GAAP earnings with the gain explicitly 
excluded.  Choi et al. (2007) find that managers in the U.K. tend to include non-recurring 
gains in non-GAAP earnings despite their transitory nature.  These results suggest that 
managers opportunistically fail to exclude transitory gains in calculating non-GAAP 
earnings in an attempt to convey better performance.  However, Curtis et al. (2014) find 
evidence of managers excluding transitory gains from non-GAAP earnings, consistent 
with informative motivations.  The mixed results from these studies examining specific 
disclosure decisions illustrate the difficulty in addressing the quality of non-GAAP 
earnings disclosures. 
2.2.3 Aggressive Non-GAAP Reporting 
Several studies examine non-GAAP reporting behavior that is deemed aggressive, 
with the assumption that aggressive reporting is opportunistic.  These include (1) 
excluding items from non-GAAP earnings in order to meet an earnings benchmark and 
(2) excluding recurring items from non-GAAP earnings beyond what analysts exclude.9  
Black and Christensen (2009) find that both non-recurring items (e.g., restructuring 
charges) and recurring items (e.g., research and development costs, depreciation and 
amortization, and stock-based compensation expense) are commonly excluded to help 
non-GAAP earnings beat the consensus analyst forecast or turn a GAAP loss into a 
                                               
9 These earnings benchmarks include changing a GAAP loss into a non-GAAP profit and just meeting or 
beating the consensus analyst forecast with the non-GAAP earnings number when the GAAP earnings 
number falls short. 
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non-GAAP profit.  However, the likelihood of these aggressive exclusions decreases 
following Sarbanes-Oxley and Regulation G (Black et al. 2015).  Doyle et al. (2013) find 
that firms with non-GAAP earnings greater than their GAAP earnings are more likely to 
meet or beat the consensus analyst forecast relative to all other firms, regardless of 
whether those firms disclose non-GAAP earnings. They interpret this result as evidence 
that managers opportunistically define non-GAAP earnings to meet this earnings 
benchmark.  However, they also find that investors discount the earnings surprise of firms 
that only meet the consensus analyst forecast through non-GAAP exclusions. Additional 
research finds this discounting of non-GAAP earnings that meet or beat the consensus 
forecast in both the pre-SOX and post-SOX periods (Black et al. 2012).  
Other studies examine insider trading activity to further explore the idea that 
excluding items from non-GAAP earnings to meet earnings benchmarks is opportunistic.  
Frankel et al. (2011) find net selling by insiders in the month following the earnings 
announcement when non-GAAP earnings exceed the consensus forecast while GAAP 
earnings do not.  They also find that this insider trading activity decreases as the 
independence of the board increases.  The level of investor sentiment is positively 
associated with this net selling by insiders after using non-GAAP exclusions to meet or 
beat an earnings benchmark (Brown et al. 2012). 
Other studies compare the non-GAAP exclusions of managers and analysts.  Gu 
and Chen (2004) find that analysts are able to identify some of the transitory components 
of earnings, evidenced by higher persistence of items included in non-GAAP earnings by 
analysts than items excluded by analysts.  Choi et al. (2007) separate non-GAAP 
exclusions of U.K. firms into three main categories: (1) non-recurring items identified by 
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analysts, (2) additional exclusions of recurring items by managers, and (3) items 
identified by analysts as non-recurring but not excluded by managers.  They find that, on 
average, recurring items excluded by managers are transitory while non-recurring items 
included in managers’ non-GAAP earnings are permanent.  Both of these results are 
consistent with managers’ non-GAAP exclusions being informative.  On the other hand, 
Brown et al. (2012) find that firms with higher investor sentiment have larger non-GAAP 
exclusions, including managers’ incremental exclusions of recurring items beyond those 
excluded by analysts.  The likelihood of these incremental managerial exclusions 
decreased following Regulation G but these incremental exclusions still occur (Black et 
al. 2015).   
 While these aggressive non-GAAP reporting behaviors could be described as 
opportunistic, the question of whether these behaviors mislead investors and garble future 
earnings news is still unanswered.  Investors discount managers’ opportunistic 
non-GAAP reporting, but the information provided in non-GAAP earnings may be useful 
to investors in predicting future earnings.  
16 
3. Hypothesis Development 
 While prior research finds that, on average, non-GAAP exclusions are not 
completely transitory, there has yet to be a direct examination of whether non-GAAP 
earnings disclosures influence investors’ ability to predict future earnings news as 
reflected by current stock returns.  Studies that use the persistence of non-GAAP 
exclusions to infer the usefulness of non-GAAP earnings in predicting future earnings 
implicitly assume that investors are unable to recognize the future earnings implications 
of non-transitory non-GAAP exclusions.  Because current stock prices contain some 
information that will not be captured in earnings until a future period, I use this price 
leading earnings relation to examine whether non-GAAP earnings enhance or diminish 
investors’ ability to predict future earnings news.   
If managers use disclosure of non-GAAP earnings to convey information about 
future earnings to investors (beyond information contained in GAAP earnings), this 
additional future earnings information should be reflected in current stock returns.  
Excluding specific items in calculating non-GAAP earnings could provide an 
informational signal to investors about how managers view those items or give a clearer 
picture of the firm’s core earnings.10 Managers frequently assert in their explanation for 
the use of non-GAAP metrics that non-GAAP earnings provide useful information to 
investors in predicting future performance.  Disclosure of non-GAAP earnings also 
                                               
10 For example, stock-based compensation and research and development costs are frequently excluded 
from non-GAAP earnings despite being recurring expenses.  Managers’ exclusion of these items may signal 
that they view stock-based compensation as a way of increasing employee loyalty and productivity rather 
than simply an expense.  Similarly, managers may view research and development costs as investments in 
the future of the firm and not merely expenses.  Both of these signals about the specific excluded items 
could provide information about future earnings.  A persistence-based evaluation of non-GAAP earnings 
would conclude that these non-GAAP earnings are of lower quality because these items persist into future 
earnings. 
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exposes the firm to greater scrutiny from external parties such as regulators or 
shareholders (Christensen et al. 2015).  Due to this increase scrutiny, managers may not 
be willing to provide non-GAAP earnings or may exclude fewer items in calculating 
non-GAAP earnings.  Firms that stopped disclosing non-GAAP earnings following 
Regulation G had lower quality non-GAAP earnings prior to Regulation G, suggesting 
that the costs of regulatory scrutiny may have been too great for those firms (Kolev et al. 
2008).  Firms that choose to disclose non-GAAP earnings could therefore provide 
informative signals about future earnings news.   
Alternatively, non-GAAP earnings disclosures may garble information about 
future earnings.  Recent evidence from the business press suggests that the difference 
between GAAP earnings and non-GAAP earnings is increasing over time (Francis and 
Linebaugh 2015; Kingsbury 2016; Lahart 2016a).  Additionally, firms with larger 
non-GAAP exclusions have worse stock returns in the periods following the earnings 
announcement (Doyle et al. 2003; Lahart 2016b).  Higher levels of non-GAAP exclusions 
may make it more difficult to identify relevant future earnings information.  It is also 
possible that larger exclusions may be one-time items that are not relevant for future 
earnings and non-GAAP earnings excluding those items may provide useful information 
to investors about future earnings.  As it is not clear ex ante whether larger non-GAAP 
exclusions increase or decrease future earnings predictability, my first hypothesis is non-
directional and stated in null form: 
H1: The extent to which future earnings news is reflected in current stock returns is not 
associated with the magnitude of a firm’s non-GAAP exclusions. 
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 Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) suggest that when managers have stronger 
preferences for a higher current stock price, they will report higher non-GAAP earnings 
regardless of the firm’s true performance.  In this case, managers would care less about 
their reputation for accurate reporting in favor of higher equity valuation.  Managers may 
therefore exclude items to inflate non-GAAP earnings which could distort investors’ 
expectations of future earnings.  Concerns from regulators and the business press focus 
on non-GAAP earnings that exceed GAAP earnings due to income-increasing exclusions 
made by managers (Francis and Linebaugh 2015; Lahart 2016a; Michaels and Rapoport 
2016).  Additionally, prior research suggests that income-decreasing exclusions are 
transitory, consistent with informative managerial motives (Baumker et al. 2014; Curtis 
et al. 2014).  I therefore expect that income-increasing non-GAAP exclusions will be 
associated with garbling of future earnings information while income-decreasing 
exclusions will help investors to better predict future earnings: 
H2a: Income-increasing non-GAAP exclusions are associated with less future earnings 
news reflected in current stock returns. 
H2b: Income-decreasing non-GAAP exclusions are associated with more future 




4. Research Design and Sample Selection 
4.1 Research Design 
To test the usefulness of non-GAAP earnings in predicting future earnings, I begin 
with a model of the return-earnings relation from Collins et al. (1994): 
Rt = α0 + α1UXt + ∑  αk+1ΔEt(Xt+k)
3
k=1  + εt (1) 
In this model, the annual stock return (Rt) is explained by three components: 
unexpected earnings in the current period (UXt), the change in expected earnings for 
future periods (ΔEt(Xt+k)), and random noise (εt).
11  Future earnings predictability is 
represented by the relation between information disclosed during the current period 
(captured by the current stock return) and the change in expected future earnings (α2, α3, 
and α4).  However, because expected earnings in the current period and future periods are 
unobservable, I use the model implemented by Lundholm and Myers (2002), Tucker and 
Zarowin (2006), Orpurt and Zang (2009), Choi et al. (2011), and Drake et al. (2015), 
which utilizes proxies for unexpected and expected earnings: 
Rt = β0 + β1Xt-1 + β2Xt + β3Xt3 + β4Rt3 + εt (2) 
In Model (2), Rt is the current year’s stock return, measured over the fiscal year, 
which incorporates all public information disclosed in that period.  Xt-1 and Xt are earnings 
per share (EPS) for the prior year and the current year, which proxy for the unexpected 
earnings in the current year.12  Xt3 is the sum of EPS over the subsequent three years, a 
                                               
11 Collins et al. (1994) limit future earnings to three years in their model because empirically returns do not 
significantly explain future earnings beyond three years (Kothari and Sloan 1992). 
12 As Lundholm and Myers (2002) state, use of both current and prior earnings allows for a more flexible 
estimation of expected earnings.  If earnings are treated as a random walk and the prior earnings are the 
expectation of current earnings then β1 and β2 should be of similar magnitude and opposite signs, equivalent 
to using the change in earnings.  Alternatively, if the expectation of earnings each year is zero then β1 
should be close to zero. 
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proxy for expected future earnings.13,14  However, realized future earnings contain both 
an expected portion and an unexpected portion.  To isolate the expected portion of future 
earnings, the realized stock return over years t+1 through t+3 (Rt3) is included to control 
for the unexpected portion of future earnings, as unexpected shocks to future earnings 
will be captured in future returns.  Therefore, the coefficient on Xt3 (β3) represents the 
degree to which future earnings information is reflected in current stock returns, and is 
referred to as the future earnings response coefficient (FERC).  Prior research finds that 
more informative disclosures allow current stock returns to reflect more future earnings 
news (Lundholm and Myers 2002; Orpurt and Zang 2009; Choi et al. 2011).  To the extent 
that the FERC captures changes in investors’ expectations of future earnings, firms with 
more informative disclosures will have higher FERCs.   
 To test my first hypothesis of whether the magnitude of non-GAAP exclusions 
impacts the extent to which future earnings information is reflected in current stock 
returns, I estimate the following model using the sample of firm-year observations where 
non-GAAP earnings per share was disclosed:15 
 
                                               
13 My main tests use future GAAP earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations 
(EPSFX).  As alternative measures, I also use future GAAP earnings from operations (OPREPSX) and 
future non-GAAP EPS. 
14 Xt-1, Xt, and Xt3 are all adjusted for stock splits and stock dividends and scaled by beginning of period 
stock price. 
15 Disclosing non-GAAP earnings is a non-random choice made by managers and unobservable factors that 
influence this choice may also be associated with the relation between current returns and future earnings.  
In untabulated analysis, I implement a Heckman selection model  (Heckman 1979) with the disclosure of 
non-GAAP earnings modeled in the first stage and the inverse Mills ratio from this first stage included in 
all my regressions to control for the unobservable characteristics associated with the choice to disclose 
non-GAAP earnings.  Using a number of different instruments to meet the exclusion condition (percentage 
of firms in the industry year disclosing non-GAAP, whether any analyst following the firm follows a 
non-GAAP disclosing firm, whether the audit office of the firm’s auditor has any clients to disclose non-
GAAP earnings that year, or a financial crisis indicator), I obtain qualitatively similar results to those 
presented in the tables. 
21 
Rt = β0 + β1Xt-1 + β2Xt + β3Xt3 + β4Rt3 + β5NGt + β6NGt*Xt-1 + β7NGt*Xt  
+ β8NGt*Xt3 + β9NGt*Rt3 + γnControls + δnControls*Xt3 + εt (3) 
 In this model, NG is a fractional ranking within each industry-year of the absolute 
value of a firm’s non-GAAP exclusions per share, scaled so that values range from 0 to 
1.  To reduce the influence of outliers that have very large per share values, I scale the 
non-GAAP exclusions by the absolute value of GAAP earnings per share before 
calculating the ranking.16  Observations with NG equal to zero represent firms with the 
smallest absolute difference between non-GAAP EPS and the comparable EPS within a 
given industry-year.  Likewise, observations with the largest absolute non-GAAP 
exclusions within a given industry-year have NG equal to one.  
Because there is no single EPS value that is clearly the best comparison for 
non-GAAP EPS, I use three different comparable EPS values that are commonly used in 
the literature: (1) GAAP earnings per share before extraordinary items (EPSGAAP), (2) 
GAAP earnings per share from operations (EPSOP), and (3) the IBES Actual EPS 
(EPSStreet), often referred to in the literature as “street earnings”, which has been adjusted 
in accordance with analysts’ exclusions (Bradshaw and Sloan 2002; Doyle et al. 2013).  
Using these three different comparable earnings values results in three different NG 
variables: NGTotal, NGRecur, and NGIncr. NGTotal measures the magnitude of the total 
non-GAAP exclusions, calculated as the difference between manager-adjusted 
non-GAAP EPS and GAAP EPS before extraordinary items (EXCLTotal in Figure 1).
17  
                                               
16 For robustness, I use three alternatives before calculating the rankings for the NG variable: (1) no scalar, 
leaving the non-GAAP exclusions as per share amounts, (2) multiplying by shares used for calculating 
diluted EPS (CSHFD) then scaling by total assets (AT), and (3) scaling by beginning of period price.  The 
results are qualitatively similar using each of these alternatives. 
17 For non-GAAP exclusions calculations, all earnings per share values are on a diluted basis.  The basis of 
the IBES Actual is determined based on equality to any of the Compustat EPS numbers (EPSPI, EPSFI, 
EPSPX, EPSFX, OPEPS, or OPREPSX) then on the primary/diluted indicator in IBES (PDI).  Consistent 
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NGRecur measures the magnitude of managers’ exclusion of recurring items, calculated as 
the difference between manager-adjusted non-GAAP EPS and GAAP EPS from 
operations (EXCLRecur in Figure 1).  Finally, NGIncr measures managers’ incremental 
exclusions beyond the exclusions made by analysts, calculated as the difference between 
manager-adjusted non-GAAP EPS and the IBES Actual EPS or “street earnings” 
(EXCLIncr in Figure 1).   
The coefficient of interest is the interaction term between NG and future earnings 
(β8), which represents the difference in the FERC between the firms with the largest 
non-GAAP exclusions relative to firms with the smallest non-GAAP exclusions.  A 
positive β8 would indicate that as the magnitude of non-GAAP exclusions increases, the 
FERC increases, suggesting that non-GAAP earnings disclosures convey additional 
information about future earnings.  Alternatively, a negative β8 indicates a decrease in the 
FERC as non-GAAP exclusions increase, suggesting that non-GAAP earnings 
disclosures garble future earnings news. 
I include several other variables as controls that have been shown in prior 
literature to be associated with the choice to disclose non-GAAP earnings (Heflin and 
Hsu 2008; Brown et al. 2012; Christensen et al. 2014; Heflin et al. 2015).  These include 
prior disclosure of non-GAAP earnings (LAG_NONGAAP), having operating earnings 
that fall short of the consensus forecast (MISS), reporting negative earnings from 
operations (LOSS), firm size (SIZE), earnings volatility (STDROA), analyst following 
(NUMANALYSTS), leverage (LEVERAGE), book-to-market ratio (BTM), magnitude of 
special items (SPECIAL), asset tangibility (INTAN), and reporting an increase in earnings 
                                               
with Bradshaw et al. (2016), I convert from basic to diluted using the ratio of EPSFI to EPSPI and the IBES 
dilution factor when EPSFI is missing.  If OPREPSX is missing, I adjust OPEPS in a similar fashion. 
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from the prior year (UPEARN).  Detailed variable definitions are provided in the 
Appendix.  Size, earnings volatility, loss incidence, and analyst coverage are important 
controls to include not only because of their association with the probability of 
non-GAAP disclosure, but they have also been shown to be associated with FERCs 
(Tucker and Zarowin 2006; Orpurt and Zang 2009; Choi et al. 2011).18  In my regression 
analyses, I use the fractional ranking within industry-year of each these variables so a 0 
represents observations with the lowest value of each variable and a 1 represents the 
observations with the highest value of each variable within a given industry-year.  
Additionally, I interact each of these variables with future earnings (Xt3) to control for 
any effect they may have on the FERC.19  I also include year and industry fixed effects 
(using the Fama-French 48 industry classifications) to control for returns being correlated 
within a given year or industry and cluster standard errors by firm in all my tests.20 
 Prior literature suggests that income-increasing non-GAAP exclusions are 
different than income-decreasing non-GAAP exclusions, with the general finding (based 
on earnings persistence models) that income-decreasing non-GAAP exclusions are more 
informative (Choi et al. 2007; Baumker et al. 2014; Curtis et al. 2014).  To test my second 
hypothesis of whether the direction of the non-GAAP exclusions affects the FERC, I 
estimate the following model: 
                                               
18 Controlling for the effect of losses on the predictability of future earnings could diminish the overall 
effect of non-GAAP earnings.  That is, one could argue that non-GAAP earnings could be more informative 
when firms report losses, and controlling for losses would capture some of over effect of non-GAAP 
earnings.  As a robustness test, I drop LOSS and LOSS*Xt3 from the model which results in qualitatively 
similarly results. 
19 In untabulated results, I find similar results when interacting all control variables with Xt-1, Xt, and Rt3 in 
addition to Xt3.  
20 Because the percentage of firms disclosing non-GAAP earnings and the magnitude of non-GAAP 
exclusions is increasing over my sample (see Figure 2), I also interact the year fixed effects with Xt3 to 
control for any effect individual years may have on the predictability of future earnings. 
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+*Xt + β8NGt+*Xt3 + β9NGt
+*Rt3 + β10NGt 
– + β11NGt 
-*Xt-1 
+ β10NGt 
-*Xt + β13NGt -*Xt3 + β14NGt 
-*Rt3 + γnControls  
+ δnControls*Xt3 + εt (4) 
 NG+ is equal to NG for observations where non-GAAP EPS was greater than the 
comparable EPS, while NG- is equal to NG for observations where non-GAAP EPS was 
less than the comparable earnings.  β8 represents whether income-increasing non-GAAP 
exclusions enhance or garble future earnings information while β13 represents the effect 
of income-decreasing non-GAAP exclusions on the FERC.  I predict that β8 will be 
negative, consistent with larger income-increasing non-GAAP exclusions garbling future 
earnings information and making prediction of future earnings more difficult for 
investors.  I also predict that β13 will be positive, which would indicate that income-
decreasing non-GAAP exclusions help investors to better predict future earnings. 
 As an additional test of this hypothesis, I identify “suspect” firm-year 
observations where managers use non-GAAP exclusions to meet earnings benchmarks 
and estimate the following model: 
Rt = β0 + β1Xt-1 + β2Xt + β3Xt3 + β4Rt3 + β5 NGt
+ + β6 NGt
+*Xt-1  
+ β7 NGt
+*Xt + β8 NGt
+*Xt3 + β9 NGt
+*Rt3 + β10SUSPECTt  
+ β11SUSPECTt*Xt-1 + β10SUSPECTt*Xt + β13SUSPECTt*Xt3  
+ β14SUSPECTt*Rt3 + β15SUSPECTt* NGt
+  
+ β16SUSPECTt* NGt
+*Xt-1 + β17SUSPECTt* NGt
+*Xt  
+ β18SUSPECTt* NGt+*Xt3 + β19SUSPECTt* NGt
+*Rt3 + γnControls  
+ δnControls*Xt3 + εt (5) 
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 SUSPECT is one of three indicator variables: PROFIT, MEET, or JUSTMEET.  
PROFIT is equal to one if non-GAAP EPS is positive or equal to zero while GAAP EPS 
from operations is negative.  MEET is equal to one if non-GAAP EPS is equal to or greater 
than the consensus analyst forecast while analyst-adjusted “street earnings” fail to meet 
the consensus forecast.  JUSTMEET is equal to one for those observations where 
non-GAAP EPS meets or beats the consensus by $0.02 or less while “street earnings” fall 
short. The scenarios for MEET and JUSTMEET require that managers use incremental 
non-GAAP exclusions to meet the consensus forecast and represent more aggressive 
non-GAAP reporting behavior.  Therefore, I only examine incremental exclusions 
(NGIncr) when SUSPECT is equal to MEET or JUSTMEET. 
For this analysis, I use NG+ in the regressions because only income-increasing 
exclusions could cause non-GAAP earnings to meet an earnings threshold when GAAP 
earnings from operations fall short.  Thus, the interpretation of the coefficients becomes 
relative to firm year observations that have no difference between non-GAAP and 
comparable earnings or have income-decreasing non-GAAP exclusions.  Hirshleifer and 
Teoh's (2003) limited attention theory suggests that non-GAAP earnings will be more 
misleading when managers are focused on increasing the current stock price.  Failing to 
meet earnings benchmarks can have negative compensation effects for managers 
(Matsunaga and Park 2001), providing managers with incentive to meet the earnings 
benchmark through non-GAAP exclusions.21 I predict that the information garbling effect 
will be even stronger in these cases where non-GAAP exclusions are used to meet 
                                               
21 Doyle et al. (2013) find that relative to all other firms, firms that use income-increasing non-GAAP 
exclusions to meet earnings benchmarks have lower earnings response coefficients. The impact this has on 
the predictability of future earnings, however, is unknown. 
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earnings benchmarks.  Therefore, I expect β18 to be negative. 
4.2 Sample & Data Collection 
 I begin with all firms in the intersection of Compustat, CRSP, and IBES with 
fiscal years ending between 2003 and 2012.22  I use directEDGAR to identify 8-Ks that 
contain an earnings announcement by a combination of their filing date, item number and 
the filing containing either “press release” or “news release”.23 I match these based on 
CIK and date.  Because firms are required to provide a reconciliation between non-GAAP 
earnings and GAAP earnings, I attempt to identify this reconciliation table within the 
press release.  I chose to focus on disclosure of non-GAAP EPS rather than non-GAAP 
earnings because earnings per share is a summary performance number often focused on 
by the business press and is the summary value forecasted by analysts.24  Using 
directEDGAR, I extract the tables from the press releases that contain any information on 
a “per share” basis.  Using Python, I then identify the  tables that contain any non-GAAP 
words, such as “adjusted,” “non-GAAP,” “pro forma,” “excluding,” “ongoing earnings,” 
“normalized earnings,” “core earnings” or their variants, similar to Bentley et al. (2016). 
 This process identifies 18,077 tables from these earnings announcement press 
releases that contain non-GAAP words or phrases.  I then collect non-GAAP earnings per 
share from these tables utilizing Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), paying individuals 
                                               
22 My sample period begins in 2003 because prior to the implementation of Regulation G in 2003, firms 
did not have to file earnings announcements with the SEC.  My sample period ends in 2012 to allow for 
the three years of future earnings and returns required by the model. 
23 I match 8-Ks to Compustat/CRSP/IBES based on the 8-K filing being within one week of the earnings 
announcement (for the majority, the earnings announcement date and the 8-K filing date are the same day).  
Consistent with DellaVigna and Pollet (2009), I use the earlier earnings announcement date from 
Compustat (RDQ) or IBES (ANNDATS).  Earnings announcements typically have Item 2.02 (Results of 
Operations and Financial Condition), but some firms use Item 7.01 (Regulation FD Disclosure), Item 8.01 
(Other Events), or Item 9.01 (Financial Statements and Exhibits). 
24 Additionally, non-GAAP per share performance measures are specifically identified by the SEC in the 
Non-GAAP Compliance & Disclosure Interpretations (SEC 2016).  
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to identify and record GAAP and non-GAAP EPS from the tables for the years provided.  
To ensure accuracy of the data collection, I identify ten sample tables with various 
presentation formats and different non-GAAP descriptors and require that an individual 
correctly identify both the GAAP EPS and the non-GAAP EPS from nine of the ten tables 
to be able to help with data collection.  If an individual was interested in the data 
collection task, but not accurate on these first ten tables, I provided ten different tables 
for a second opportunity to qualify based on accurately identifying the relevant EPS 
values with the same 90% accuracy standard.   
I require that each table be recorded by two different individuals and I manually 
review each table with any discrepancies.  Roughly 14.7% of the tables (2,665/18,077) 
had discrepancies from what was recorded by the two individuals.  However, the majority 
of these discrepancies were due to table extraction errors where column headers were not 
extracted with rest of the table, making correct identification impossible.  In these cases, 
I identify the associated 8-K on the SEC’s EDGAR website and record the relevant data.  
Additionally, if an individual was unsure of the data they recorded, they could leave a 
comment for me to check their work.  I provided feedback to individuals with the trends 
of common mistakes I saw when reviewing the recorded data. 
Over the course of the data collection period, 84 individuals met the accuracy 
standard to record data from the sample tables.  Of these, 35 input data from at least 100 
tables.  However, almost 60% of the data collection was done by four individuals, with 
one individual submitting the data from 9,373 tables.25  This data collection yielded 
                                               
25 MTurk ensures that a specific individual could only input the data from a given table one time.  Thus, 
each of the 9,373 tables recorded by this one individual were also recorded by another worker. 
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non-GAAP EPS values for 12,625 firm-years between 2002 and 2014.26  
I exclude observations that are missing data for past, current and future three 
years’ GAAP earnings, and for observations missing current year and future three years’ 
returns.  To minimize the effect of outliers, I exclude observations in the top or bottom 
one percent of the distributions of each of those variables, consistent with Tucker and 
Zarowin (2006), Orpurt and Zang (2009), and Choi et al. (2011).  All other variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  This results in a final sample of 7,010 firm-year 
observations from 2003 through 2012.27  Descriptive statistics for my sample can be 
found in Table 1.  The median total exclusions are $0.20 per share while the median 
recurring exclusions are $0.05 per share and the median incremental exclusions are $0.00 
per share.  Untabulated descriptive statistics show that the manager-adjusted non-GAAP 
earnings differ from GAAP earnings before extraordinary items 93.4% of the time, differ 
from GAAP earnings from operations 83.8% of the time and differ from “street earnings” 
(IBES Actual) 43.7% of the time.28  Both the percentage of firms disclosing non-GAAP 
earnings (Figure 2 Panel A) and the magnitude of non-GAAP exclusions (Figure 2 Panel 
B) are increasing over time in my sample period, consistent with reports in the business 
press (Lahart 2016a).  The correlations in Table 2 suggest a negative association between 
the various non-GAAP exclusions measures and both current returns and future earnings.  
However, the focus of this study is whether non-GAAP exclusions have an impact on the 
                                               
26 All of the 2002 observations were from press releases reporting 2003 data, which also provided 
non-GAAP EPS data for 2002 as the prior period. 
27 Although I have firm-year observations from 2002 from my data collection, I use only those observations 
from 2003 to ensure that all the observations are post-Regulation G.  Results are qualitative similar when 
including 2002 in the analysis.  Requiring three years of future GAAP earnings eliminates 2013 and 2014 
data. 
28 These results are more consistent with Bhattacharya et al. (2003), who report manager-adjusted 
non-GAAP earnings differ from “street earnings” 35% of the time, and not the 6% suggested by Doyle et 
al. (2013). 
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association between current returns and future earnings, which cannot be examined 
directly from the correlations in Table 2.  
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5. Results 
The estimation of Model (3) is presented in Table 3 with observations ranked 
based on the absolute magnitude of the non-GAAP exclusions.  The columns present 
rankings based on total exclusions, recurring exclusions and incremental exclusions, 
respectively. The negative coefficient on Xt-1 combined with the positive coefficient on 
Xt are consistent with the positive relation between current period returns and the change 
in earnings.  The positive coefficient on Xt3 and negative coefficient on Rt3 are consistent 
with current period returns being positively associated with expected future earnings for 
firms with the smallest non-GAAP exclusions. Coefficients on the interactions between 
control variables and future earnings are generally as expected (untabulated).  Firms with 
greater earnings volatility and loss firms have lower FERCs.  Analyst coverage is 
positively associated with FERCs as expected, but not significant. 
For the test of H1, the coefficient on the interaction between the non-GAAP 
exclusion ranking and future earnings (β8) is negative and significant, regardless of 
whether non-GAAP earnings are compared to GAAP earnings before extraordinary 
items, operating earnings or “street earnings.”  Thus, as the magnitude of a firm’s 
non--GAAP exclusions increases, the association between current returns and future 
earnings decreases, consistent with non-GAAP earnings garbling future earnings 
information, making it more difficult for investors to predict future earnings. 
Table 4 presents the estimation of Model (4) where income-increasing and 
income-decreasing non-GAAP exclusions are separated.  Regardless of which 
comparable earnings is used, the interaction between income-increasing non-GAAP 
exclusions and future earnings is negative and significant.  This supports H2a and 
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suggests that the results in Table 3 are driven by income-increasing non-GAAP 
exclusions.  However, the interaction between income-decreasing non-GAAP exclusions 
and future earnings is not significant, suggesting that while income-decreasing exclusions 
may be transitory (Baumker et al. 2014; Curtis et al. 2014), the magnitude of these 
exclusions does not influence investors ability to predict future earnings.  Thus, I do not 
find support for H2b.  The garbling of future earnings information seems to be 
concentrated among firms with larger income-increasing non-GAAP exclusions, lending 
support to critics concerns that non-GAAP earnings are opportunistically reported. 
 The models in both Table 3 and Table 4 examine the association between current 
period returns and future GAAP earnings before extraordinary items, which may not be 
the most appropriate measure for evaluating the quality of non-GAAP earnings 
disclosures.  If managers exclude items from non-GAAP earnings to convey information 
about the firm’s future operating performance, non-GAAP earnings disclosures may be 
more useful in predicting earnings from operations rather than earnings before 
extraordinary items.  To examine this question, I replace GAAP earnings before 
extraordinary items with GAAP earnings from operations and re-estimate the equations 
with results presented in Table 5.   
 The results are generally similar to those presented in Table 3 and Table 4, 
suggesting that the findings are not dependent on using GAAP earnings before 
extraordinary items rather than operating earnings.  The results in Panel A of Table 5 
provide evidence that as the magnitude of non-GAAP exclusions increases, the 
association between current returns and future operating earnings decreases, consistent 
with larger non-GAAP exclusions garbling information about future earnings from 
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operations.  Panel B separates the non-GAAP exclusions into income-increasing and 
income-decreasing exclusions and suggests that income-increasing non-GAAP 
exclusions drive the result of a lower FERC, similar to the results in Table 4.   
In untabulated analysis, I re-estimate the models using past, current and future 
non-GAAP earnings.29  In this analysis, the results when non-GAAP earnings are 
compared to GAAP earnings (total exclusions) or operating earnings (recurring 
exclusions) are no longer significant.  However, the results for incremental non-GAAP 
exclusions relative to “street earnings” are still significant.  This may be due to the 
decreased sample size or that total and recurring exclusions are not as relevant in 
predicting future non-GAAP earnings.   
Regardless of which future earnings measure is used (GAAP earnings before 
extraordinary items, earnings from operations or non-GAAP earnings), I find no evidence 
of non-GAAP earnings increasing the amount of future earnings news reflected in current 
stock returns.  On the other hand, I find evidence that as the magnitude of non-GAAP 
exclusions increase, the FERC decreases, consistent with non-GAAP earnings 
disclosures garbling future earnings information, decreasing investors’ ability to predict 
future earnings. 
 As an additional test of H2a, I examine situations where non-GAAP earnings 
may be less informative due to pressures managers face associated with meeting earnings 
benchmarks.  If non-GAAP exclusions are used to meet an earnings benchmark, I identify 
those observations as “suspect.”  The first three columns of Table 6 present the results of 
estimating Model (5) with PROFIT as the SUSPECT variable.  The three-way interaction 
                                               
29 This reduces the sample size to 2,835 because it requires that a firm disclose non-GAAP earnings for 
five consecutive years to be included in the estimation. 
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between PROFIT, NG+ and Xt3 is not significant in any of these columns, suggesting that 
using non-GAAP exclusions to change a GAAP operating loss into a non-GAAP profit 
does not incrementally impact the extent the which future earnings news is reflected in 
current stock returns.30 The fourth and fifth columns of Table 6 present the results of 
using MEET and JUSTMEET as the SUSPECT variable.  The three-way interaction 
between MEET, NG+ and Xt3 in column four is insignificant while the three-way 
interaction between JUSTMEET, NG+ and Xt3 in the last column is negative and 
significant (one-tailed p-value <0.1).31  These findings suggest that using incremental 
non-GAAP exclusions to just meet or beat the consensus forecast results in a stronger 
information garbling effect, consistent with Hirshleifer and Teoh's (2003) theory.  That 
is, future earning are incrementally more difficult for investors to predict when managers 
use incremental non-GAAP exclusions to just meet or beat the consensus analyst forecast.  
However, this result is limited to settings where managers aggressively exclude items 
beyond what analysts have excluded in order to just meet or beat the consensus forecast. 
  
                                               
30 In additional untabulated tests, I examine cases where a GAAP loss before extraordinary items (EPSFX 
< 0) is turned into a non-GAAP profit and cases where non-GAAP earnings just exceed zero by $0.01 or 
less.  I do not find significant results in either of these cases. I also examine when “street earnings” meet or 
beat the consensus forecast but non-GAAP EPS is less than the consensus from managers’ use of income-
decreasing exclusions.  In untabulated analysis, I find that the three-way interaction is insignificant in these 
cases. 
31 If exclusions are not scaled by GAAP EPS before calculating NG, this has a two-tailed p-value of less 
than 0.05. 
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6. Robustness Tests & Additional Analysis 
6.1 Propensity Score Matched Sample 
 I find that firms with larger non-GAAP exclusions have a weaker association 
between current returns and future earnings, consistent with non-GAAP earnings 
disclosures garbling future earnings news.  However, it is possible that firms with larger 
non-GAAP exclusions have innately less predictable future earnings due to other firm 
characteristics and as a result, the weaker association I find for these firms may not be 
due to the non-GAAP exclusions.  Although I include a number of firm characteristics in 
my regressions as control variables, their effectiveness as controls depends on the linear 
relation between variables assumed when using OLS regression.  Propensity score 
matching (PSM) can help address this concern of functional form misspecification, 
discussed in detail by Shipman et al. (2017).  In PSM, treatment and control observations 
are matched based on an estimated probability of treatment (Rosenbaum and Rubin 
1983). This creates a sample of matched pairs that differ only in the variable of interest 
and all other characteristics are similar across the two groups.  Thus, differences in the 
outcome variable between the two groups are more reliably due to the treatment than 
differences in group composition. 
 In my setting, the “treatment” would be firms with large non-GAAP exclusions 
and “control” firms being those with small non-GAAP exclusions.  I first estimate a 
propensity to disclose large non-GAAP exclusions using the following model:   
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Pr(HI_EXCLt = 1) = f ( λ0 + λ1EXCLt-1  + λ2MISSt + λ4LOSSt + λ5SIZEt  
+ λ6STDROAt + λ7NUMANALYSTSt + λ8LEVERAGEt  
+ λ9BTMt + λ10SPECIALt + λ11INTANt + λ11UPEARNt  
+ Year FE + Industry FE + εt ) (6) 
HI_EXCL is a dummy variable equal to one if the magnitude of a firm’s 
non-GAAP exclusions (scaled by GAAP EPS) are above the industry median in year t.  
EXCLt-1 is the firm’s non-GAAP exclusions (scaled by GAAP EPS) in the prior year.  All 
other variables are previously defined.  I estimate this model separately for total 
exclusions, recurring exclusions and incremental exclusions.  Firms with larger 
non-GAAP exclusions (HI_EXCL=1) are then matched to firms with smaller non-GAAP 
exclusions (HI_EXCL=0) based on the predicted values from Model (6).  I use a caliper 
distance that is equal to 20% of the standard deviation of the predicted propensity score, 
as suggested by Austin (2011). 
Panel A of Table 7 presents the estimation of Model (6) for EXCLIncr while Panel 
B provides a comparison of means of the covariates across the two groups after matching 
on propensity scores.  Within my matched sample, there are significantly more firms with 
negative operating earnings with smaller incremental non-GAAP exclusions than in the 
larger incremental exclusions group.  However, firms with negative operating earnings 
have a weaker association between current returns and future earning, so having more of 
these firms in the small non-GAAP exclusion group would bias against finding the 
negative coefficient on the NGt*Xt3 using this sample. 
The results of estimating Model (3) and Model (4) using the PSM sample are 
presented in Table 7 Panel C and Panel D, respectively.  The coefficient on the interaction 
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between non-GAAP exclusions and future earnings is negative and significant for both 
recurring exclusions and incremental exclusions, consistent with my prior findings, while 
the result for total non-GAAP exclusions is no longer significant.  This is also the case 
with the income-increasing exclusions presented in Panel D.  Thus, after matching on the 
propensity to disclose larger non-GAAP exclusions, I find that the association between 
current returns and future earnings is weaker for firms with larger non-GAAP exclusions, 
consistent with non-GAAP exclusions garbling future earnings information.32 
6.2 Consistent Non-GAAP Reporters 
 In the May 2016 update to the Compliance and Disclosure Interpretation related 
to non-GAAP reporting, the SEC specifies that inconsistently reporting non-GAAP 
financial measures between periods could be misleading (SEC 2016).  Although I am not 
able to identify the specific items excluded in calculating non-GAAP EPS each year, I 
attempt to proxy for consistent non-GAAP reporting firms based on a specific reporting 
phenomenon.  There are 461 observations in my sample where non-GAAP EPS is equal 
to GAAP EPS before extraordinary items.  It is not clear why a firm would report 
non-GAAP EPS equal to GAAP EPS, unless the firm consistently reports non-GAAP 
EPS, excluding the same items each period, and none of those items occurred during the 
specified period.  I identify firms that reported non-GAAP EPS equal to GAAP EPS at 
least once during my sample period (24.6% of the 1,952 firms in my sample, or 26.1% of 
the 7,010 firm-year observations).  For each of those firms’ annual observations, I set 
CONSISTENT equal to one.  
                                               
32 In untabulated analysis using the PSM sample, I do not find significant results for Model (5) with the 
“suspect” observations.  I do not find this alarming due to the reduced sample size from matching combined 
with the small number of observations in the JUSTMEET condition. 
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Table 8 presents the results of comparing the FERC of these firms to all other 
firms in my sample.  I find that the interaction between CONSISTENT and Xt3 is positive 
and significant, suggesting that the FERC is higher for these firms.  That is, firms that 
consistently report non-GAAP earnings have more future earnings information reflected 
in current stock returns than other non-GAAP reporting firms, suggesting that non-GAAP 
reporting by these firms enables investors to better predict future earnings.  I also examine 
whether non-GAAP exclusions of these firms are associated with less garbling of future 
earnings information.  The significantly positive three-way interaction in the last column 
in Table 8 suggests that larger incremental non-GAAP exclusions of these firms are 
associated with higher FERCs relative to all other non-GAAP disclosing firms.  Thus, 
opposite of my main findings, larger non-GAAP exclusions by firms that consistently 
report non-GAAP earnings appear to provide information that allows investors to better 
predict future earnings.  SEC concerns over inconsistent non-GAAP reporting seems to 
be warranted as consistent non-GAAP reporting firms are associated with less garbling 
of future earnings news.  
6.3 Earnings Components 
 Stock prices represent discounted expected future cash flows, and many firms 
exclude non-cash items in their calculation of non-GAAP earnings, presumably to help 
in the estimation of future cash flows.  I separate past, current and future earnings into its 
accrual and cash flow components and re-estimate my models to examine whether my 
results are driven by either the accrual or cash flow component alone.  In untabulated 
analysis, I find that higher magnitude non-GAAP exclusions as associated with both less 
predictable future accruals and less predictable future cash flows.  The magnitude and 
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significance of the coefficient on the cash flow component is roughly double that on the 
accrual component.  This result holds when separating income-increasing and income-
decreasing exclusions as well.  
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7. Conclusion 
Former SEC Chair Mary Jo White has repeatedly expressed concern over 
non-GAAP measures potentially confusing investors (White 2015; White 2016).  Despite 
these concerns, the academic literature has yet to provide direct tests of whether 
non-GAAP earnings disclosures convey additional information to investors about future 
earnings or garble future earnings news.  Using the association between current period 
returns and expected future earnings, I examine whether non-GAAP earnings impact 
investors’ ability to predict future earnings.  I provide evidence that as the magnitude of 
the managers’ non-GAAP exclusions increase, less information about future earnings is 
reflected in current stock returns, consistent with non-GAAP earnings garbling future 
earnings news.  This information garbling effect is driven by income-increasing 
non-GAAP exclusions, where managers provide a non-GAAP earnings number that 
exceeds GAAP earnings.  I find consistent results when using future GAAP earnings 
before extraordinary items, future GAAP earnings from operations, or future non-GAAP 
earnings.  I also provide evidence that managers excluding items beyond analysts’ 
exclusions in order to meet or beat the consensus earnings forecast is associated with 
incrementally more garbling of future earnings news. To the extent that regulators are 
concerned about non-GAAP earnings confusing investors by garbling future earnings 
news, the results of this study suggest that regulators concerns are warranted.  However, 
the effect of recent guidance released by the SEC related to non-GAAP disclosures in 
mitigating the disclosure of misleading information remains to be seen.  
Many studies use “street earnings” as a proxy for the non-GAAP earnings 
disclosed by managers.  However, the results of this paper indicate that the differences 
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between manager-adjusted non-GAAP earnings and analyst-adjusted “street earnings” 
are associated with different levels of future earnings information reflected in current 
stock returns.  Therefore, “street earnings” may not be an appropriate proxy for manager-
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Appendix A: Tables and Figures 
Table 1 - Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Std Dev Min 0.25 Median 0.75 Max 
EPSGAAP 1.068 2.427 -33.260 0.130 0.940 2.010 27.660 
EPSOp 1.415 1.963 -15.220 0.320 1.100 2.180 28.190 
EPSStreet 1.562 1.921 -14.050 0.480 1.220 2.290 31.280 
EPSNonGAAP 1.623 1.924 -14.050 0.520 1.250 2.310 32.930 
Rt 0.120 0.475 -0.815 -0.166 0.072 0.321 3.327 
Xt-1 0.002 0.193 -2.417 0.010 0.041 0.065 0.314 
Xt 0.020 0.125 -1.140 0.010 0.045 0.071 0.382 
Xt3 0.107 0.291 -1.955 0.009 0.144 0.248 1.414 
Rt3 0.352 0.841 -0.946 -0.218 0.210 0.695 4.876 
EXCLTotal 0.519 1.251 -2.060 0.010 0.200 0.580 7.420 
EXCLRecur 0.196 0.599 -1.680 0.000 0.050 0.290 3.280 
EXCLIncr 0.052 0.332 -1.150 0.000 0.000 0.020 2.060 
SIZE 7.363 1.758 2.138 6.103 7.270 8.510 12.399 
STDROA 0.072 0.087 0.001 0.023 0.047 0.088 0.859 
NUMANALYSTS  2.123 0.700 0.693 1.609 2.197 2.639 3.401 
MISS 0.538 0.499 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
LOSS 0.146 0.353 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
LEVERAGE 0.204 0.189 0.000 0.028 0.175 0.320 0.829 
BTM 0.532 0.383 -0.186 0.272 0.459 0.709 2.545 
SPECIAL -0.019 0.046 -0.252 -0.016 -0.004 0.000 0.057 
INTAN 0.217 0.202 0.000 0.040 0.163 0.352 0.728 
UPEARN 0.594 0.491 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
LAG_NONGAAP 0.742 0.437 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
PROFIT 0.061 0.239 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
MEET 0.089 0.285 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
JUSTMEET 0.016 0.124 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
CONSISTENT 0.261 0.439 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
This table provides descriptive statistics for the sample of 7,010 firm-year 
observations of firms that disclosed non-GAAP earnings per share from 2003 to 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3 – Magnitude of Non-GAAP Exclusions 
Rt = β0 + β1Xt-1 + β2Xt + β3Xt3 + β4Rt3 + β5NGt + β6NGt*Xt-1 + β7NGt*Xt  
+ β8NGt*Xt3 + β9NGt*Rt3 + γnControls + δnControls*Xt3 + εt (3) 
 
  NGt = NGTotal NGt = NGRecur NGt = NGIncr 
Intercept 0.050 0.083 0.079 
 (0.729) (1.252) (1.133) 
Xt-1 -0.441*** -0.557*** -0.388*** 
 (-4.493) (-5.662) (-6.118) 
Xt 0.599*** 0.617*** 0.521*** 
 (3.115) (6.507) (6.912) 
Xt3 0.822*** 0.710*** 0.721*** 
 (3.379) (2.827) (2.776) 
Rt3 -0.091*** -0.113*** -0.099*** 
 (-5.924) (-8.118) (-9.497) 
NGt 0.092*** 0.086*** 0.024 
 (4.094) (4.337) (1.296) 
NGt*Xt-1 0.088 0.285** -0.028 
 (0.600) (2.095) (-0.233) 
NGt*Xt -0.145 -0.258 0.012 
 (-0.541) (-1.326) (0.066) 
NGt*Xt3 -0.314*** -0.211** -0.222** 
 (-3.072) (-2.301) (-2.211) 
NGt*Rt3 -0.007 0.034 0.020 
 (-0.302) (1.516) (0.857) 
Controls Included Included Included 
Year & Industry FE Included Included Included 
Adjusted R2 0.335 0.336 0.333 
Observations 7,010 7,010 7,010 
This table provides the results from estimating Model (3) using firm-year 
observations of firms that disclosed non-GAAP earnings per share between 2003 and 
2012.  NG, as well as all control variables are within industry-year fractional rankings 
that range from 0 to 1.  T-statistics based on standard errors clustered by firm are 
presented below each coefficient. See Appendix for variable definitions. ***, **, and 
* indicate two-tailed p-values less than 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1, respectively.   
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Table 4 – Income-Increasing & Income-Decreasing Non-GAAP Exclusions 
Rt = β0 + β1Xt-1 + β2Xt + β3Xt3 + β4Rt3 + β5NGt+ + β6NGt+*Xt-1 + β7NGt+*Xt + β8NGt+*Xt3  
+ β9NGt+*Rt3 + β10NGt – + β11NGt -*Xt-1 + β12NGt -*Xt + β13NGt -*Xt3 + β14NGt -*Rt3  
+ γnControls + δnControls*Xt3 + εt (4) 
 
  NGt = NGTotal NGt = NGRecur NGt = NGIncr 
Intercept 0.041 0.092 0.087 
 (0.591) (1.373) (1.282) 
Xt-1 -0.428*** -0.554*** -0.387*** 
 (-4.312) (-5.630) (-6.130) 
Xt 0.584*** 0.614*** 0.520*** 
 (3.017) (6.445) (6.890) 
Xt3 0.833*** 0.680*** 0.710*** 
 (3.450) (2.735) (2.735) 
Rt3 -0.092*** -0.113*** -0.098*** 
 (-5.907) (-8.112) (-9.436) 
NGt
+
 0.103*** 0.105*** 0.037* 
 (4.440) (5.081) (1.747) 
NGt
+*Xt-1 0.048 0.284** -0.028 
 (0.314) (2.036) (-0.203) 
NGt
+*Xt -0.101 -0.228 -0.029 
 (-0.365) (-1.129) (-0.139) 
NGt+*Xt3 -0.332*** -0.234** -0.275** 
 (-3.126) (-2.434) (-2.404) 
NGt
+*Rt3 -0.009 0.029 0.025 
 (-0.369) (1.266) (0.863) 
NGt 
-
 0.024 0.033 -0.017 
 (0.631) (1.047) (-0.653) 
NGt 
-*Xt-1 0.241 0.277 0.008 
 (1.506) (1.570) (0.051) 
NGt 
-*Xt -0.095 -0.298 0.098 
 (-0.272) (-0.952) (0.411) 
NGt -*Xt3 -0.221 -0.143 -0.067 
 (-1.476) (-1.118) (-0.495) 
NGt 
-*Rt3 0.011 0.049 0.011 
 (0.287) (1.458) (0.347) 
Controls Included Included Included 
Year & Industry FE Included Included Included 
Adjusted R2 0.336 0.336 0.333 
Observations 7,010 7,010 7,010 
This table provides the results from estimating Model (4).  NG, as well as all control 
variables are within industry-year fractional rankings that range from 0 to 1.  
T-statistics based on standard errors clustered by firm are presented below each 
coefficient.  See Appendix for variable definitions. ***, **, and * indicate two-tailed 
p-values less than 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1, respectively.   
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Table 5 – Predicting Operating Earnings 
Panel A: Magnitude of Non-GAAP Exclusions 
Rt = β0 + β1Xt-1 + β2Xt + β3Xt3 + β4Rt3 + β5NGt + β6NGt*Xt-1 + β7NGt*Xt  
+ β8NGt*Xt3 + β9NGt*Rt3 + γnControls + δnControls*Xt3 + εt (3) 
 
  NGt = NGTotal NGt = NGRecur NGt = NGIncr 
Intercept 0.005 0.024 0.024 
 (0.067) (0.340) (0.343) 
Xt-1 -0.611*** -1.112*** -0.733*** 
 (-3.117) (-5.363) (-5.954) 
Xt 0.279 0.802** 0.307* 
 (1.008) (2.406) (1.736) 
Xt3 1.114*** 1.071*** 1.082*** 
 (4.211) (3.805) (4.189) 
Rt3 -0.100*** -0.123*** -0.109*** 
 (-6.473) (-8.555) (-10.192) 
NGt 0.113*** 0.126*** 0.056** 
 (4.132) (5.279) (2.355) 
NGt*Xt-1 -0.130 0.711** 0.063 
 (-0.417) (2.373) (0.268) 
NGt*Xt 0.105 -0.696 0.238 
 (0.243) (-1.587) (0.659) 
NGt*Xt3 -0.265* -0.240* -0.290** 
 (-1.733) (-1.858) (-1.992) 
NGt*Rt3 -0.015 0.028 0.011 
 (-0.648) (1.240) (0.479) 
Controls Included Included Included 
Year & Industry FE Included Included Included 
Adjusted R2 0.353 0.356 0.351 
Observations 7,010 7,010 7,010 
This table provides the results from estimating Model (3) using firm-year 
observations of firms that disclosed non-GAAP earnings per share between 2003 and 
2012.  GAAP earnings from operations (OPREPSX, adjusted for stock splits and 
dividends) is used for Xt-1, Xt, and Xt3.  NG, as well as all control variables are within 
industry-year fractional rankings that range from 0 to 1.  T-statistics based on 
standard errors clustered by firm are presented below each coefficient.  See Appendix 
for variable definitions. ***, **, and * indicate two-tailed p-values less than 0.01, 
0.05 and 0.1, respectively.   
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Panel B: Income-Increasing & Income-Decreasing Non-GAAP Exclusions 
Rt = β0 + β1Xt-1 + β2Xt + β3Xt3 + β4Rt3 + β5NGt+ + β6NGt+*Xt-1 + β7NGt+*Xt + β8NGt+*Xt3  
+ β9NGt+*Rt3 + β5NGt – + β6NGt -*Xt-1 + β7NGt -*Xt + β8NGt -*Xt3 + β9NGt -*Rt3  
+ γnControls + δnControls*Xt3 + εt (4) 
 
  NGt = NGTotal NGt = NGRecur NGt = NGIncr 
Intercept -0.010 0.029 0.028 
 (-0.144) (0.394) (0.406) 
Xt-1 -0.621*** -1.099*** -0.732*** 
 (-3.178) (-5.289) (-5.944) 
Xt 0.304 0.785** 0.304* 
 (1.091) (2.352) (1.717) 
Xt3 1.136*** 1.088*** 1.064*** 
 (4.258) (3.776) (4.120) 
Rt3 -0.101*** -0.123*** -0.108*** 
 (-6.507) (-8.551) (-10.132) 
NGt
+
 0.123*** 0.146*** 0.077*** 
 (4.353) (5.753) (2.898) 
NGt
+*Xt-1 -0.229 0.642** 0.090 
 (-0.726) (2.042) (0.344) 
NGt
+*Xt 0.172 -0.468 0.215 
 (0.391) (-1.049) (0.518) 
NGt+*Xt3 -0.261* -0.257* -0.367** 
 (-1.670) (-1.861) (-2.140) 
NGt
+*Rt3 -0.016 0.027 0.016 
 (-0.664) (1.151) (0.552) 
NGt 
-
 0.109** 0.080** -0.005 
 (2.362) (2.267) (-0.141) 
NGt 
-*Xt-1 0.644* 0.914*** -0.036 
 (1.756) (2.609) (-0.113) 
NGt 
-*Xt -0.646 -1.206** 0.395 
 (-1.106) (-2.167) (0.945) 
NGt -*Xt3 -0.336 -0.108 -0.089 
 (-1.638) (-0.621) (-0.563) 
NGt 
-*Rt3 0.003 0.030 -0.002 
 (0.077) (0.946) (-0.057) 
Controls Included Included Included 
Year & Industry FE Included Included Included 
Adjusted R2 0.354 0.357 0.352 
Observations 7,010 7,010 7,010 
This table provides the results from estimating Model (4) using GAAP earnings from 
operations (OPREPSX, adjusted for stock splits and dividends) for Xt-1, Xt, and Xt3.  NG, 
as well as all control variables are within industry-year fractional rankings that range 
from 0 to 1.  T-statistics based on standard errors clustered by firm are presented below 
each coefficient.  See Appendix for variable definitions. ***, **, and * indicate two-
tailed p-values less than 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1, respectively.   
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Table 6 – Using Non-GAAP Earnings to Meet/Beat Earnings Thresholds 
SUSPECT =  PROFIT MEET JUSTMEET 
NGt = NGTotal NGRecur NGIncr NGIncr NGIncr 
Xt-1 -0.401*** -0.456*** -0.432*** -0.386*** -0.385*** 
 (-4.943) (-5.939) (-7.236) (-6.769) (-6.812) 
Xt 0.521*** 0.491*** 0.534*** 0.513*** 0.532*** 
 (3.247) (5.737) (6.480) (7.056) (7.403) 
Xt3 0.818*** 0.633** 0.696*** 0.713*** 0.712*** 
 (3.435) (2.485) (2.792) (2.788) (2.765) 
Rt3 -0.090*** -0.102*** -0.102*** -0.097*** -0.097*** 
 (-6.721) (-8.317) (-10.258) (-9.943) (-9.897) 
NGt
+
 0.095*** 0.084*** 0.038* 0.055** 0.044** 
 (4.159) (4.227) (1.794) (2.228) (2.110) 
NGt
+*Xt-1 -0.002 0.122 0.077 -0.110 -0.043 
 (-0.013) (0.933) (0.473) (-0.731) (-0.327) 
NGt
+*Xt 0.108 0.336 0.129 0.027 -0.039 
 (0.458) (1.600) (0.652) (0.159) (-0.190) 
NGt
+*Xt3 -0.320*** -0.235** -0.318*** -0.225* -0.262** 
 (-3.163) (-2.556) (-2.583) (-1.907) (-2.296) 
NGt
+*Rt3 -0.018 0.009 0.030 0.010 0.022 
 (-0.835) (0.411) (1.158) (0.334) (0.767) 
SUSPECTt 0.038 -0.112 0.097** -0.052 0.111 
 (0.292) (-0.634) (2.082) (-1.084) (1.132) 
SUSPECTt*Xt-1 0.532* -0.662 0.183 0.324 -1.698 
 (1.827) (-1.578) (1.248) (0.689) (-1.083) 
SUSPECTt*Xt -0.183 0.704* -0.003 0.479 -0.766 
 (-0.276) (1.690) (-0.022) (1.080) (-0.830) 
SUSPECTt*Xt3 -0.026 -0.308 -0.010 -0.359 0.246 
 (-0.043) (-0.518) (-0.065) (-1.192) (0.569) 
SUSPECTt*Rt3 0.151 0.164 0.051 0.038 -0.116 
 (1.440) (1.342) (1.486) (0.445) (-0.774) 
SUSPECTt*NGt
+
 -0.011 0.166 -0.125* 0.022 -0.328** 
 (-0.070) (0.834) (-1.651) (0.305) (-2.157) 
SUSPECTt*NGt
+*Xt-1 -0.630 0.853 -0.468* -0.059 3.895 
 (-1.485) (1.592) (-1.667) (-0.079) (1.499) 
SUSPECTt*NGt
+*Xt -0.172 -1.760*** -1.319** -0.789 1.113 
 (-0.183) (-2.730) (-2.523) (-0.991) (0.568) 
SUSPECTt*NGt
+*Xt3 0.212 0.543 0.150 0.298 -1.033# 
 (0.304) (0.811) (0.573) (0.718) (-1.338) 
SUSPECTt*NGt
+*Rt3 -0.131 -0.157 -0.039 -0.009 0.298 
 (-1.132) (-1.070) (-0.399) (-0.072) (1.211) 
Controls Included Included Included Included Included 
Year & Industry FE Included Included Included Included Included 
Adjusted R2 0.337 0.338 0.337 0.333 0.333 
Observations 7,010 7,010 7,010 7,010 7,010 
Model (5) estimation with standard errors clustered by firm. See Appendix for variable definitions. 
***, **, and * indicate two-tailed p-values < 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1. # indicates one-tailed p-value < 0.1.   
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Table 7 – Propensity Score Matched Sample 
Panel A: Propensity Score Estimation 
 
 Pr(HI_EXCLIncr,t = 1) = f ( λ0 + λ1EXCLt-1  + λ2MISSt + λ4LOSSt + λ5SIZEt + λ6STDROAt  
+ λ7NUMANALYSTSt + λ8LEVERAGEt + λ9BTMt + λ10SPECIALt  
+ λ11INTANt + λ11UPEARNt + Year FE + Industry FE + εt ) (6) 
  Coefficient Chi-Square p-value 
Intercept 0.1351 0.466 0.4947 
EXCLIncr,t-1 0.3060*** 94.176 <0.0001 
MISSt -0.3679*** 87.798 <0.0001 
LOSSt 0.1088* 3.372 0.0663 
SIZEt 0.0264 2.353 0.1250 
STDROAt 0.7687*** 10.174 0.0014 
NUMANALYSTSt -0.3094*** 61.734 <0.0001 
LEVERAGEt 0.0436 0.145 0.7033 
BTMt -0.0836 2.026 0.1546 
SPECIALt 0.0656*** 10.055 0.0015 
INTANt 0.0012 0.559 0.4548 
UPEARNt -0.1944*** 22.948 <0.0001 
Year & Industry FE Included   
N 5,426   
Max-rescaled R2 0.159   
Area under ROC Curve 0.708   
This table provides results from estimating Model (6) with HI_EXCL as the dependent 
variable. Chi-square values are reported to the right of the coefficient estimates.  All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. See Appendix for variable 
definitions. ***, **, and * indicate two-tailed p-values less than 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1, 
respectively.   
Panel B: Covariate Balance 
Variable 
HI_EXCLIncr = 1 
Mean 





MISS 0.546 0.569 1.04 0.297 
LOSS 0.119 0.187 4.21*** 0.000 
SIZE 7.477 7.374 -1.27 0.205 
STDROA 0.068 0.072 1.18 0.237 
NUMANALYSTS 2.197 2.153 -1.46 0.144 
LEVERAGE 0.195 0.185 -1.27 0.205 
BTM 0.530 0.542 0.66 0.511 
SPECIAL -0.018 -0.022 -1.71* 0.087 
INTAN 0.215 0.223 0.89 0.373 
UPEARN 0.599 0.579 -0.87 0.384 
N 984 984   
This table presents the mean values of the control variables across the HI_EXCLIncr = 1 and 
HI_EXCLIncr = 0  groups after using propensity score matching. See Appendix for variable 
definitions. ***, **, and * indicate two-tailed p-values less than 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1, 
respectively.   
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Panel C: Magnitude of Non-GAAP Exclusions 
Rt = β0 + β1Xt-1 + β2Xt + β3Xt3 + β4Rt3 + β5NGt + β6NGt*Xt-1 + β7NGt*Xt  
+ β8NGt*Xt3 + β9NGt*Rt3 + γnControls + δnControls*Xt3 + εt (3) 
 
  NGt = NGTotal NGt = NGRecur NGt = NGIncr 
Intercept -0.155 0.066 -0.160 
 (-1.113) (0.502) (-1.251) 
Xt-1 -0.073 -0.655*** -0.212 
 (-0.339) (-4.046) (-1.513) 
Xt -0.050 0.752*** 0.254* 
 (-0.095) (3.942) (1.886) 
Xt3 1.144*** 0.697* 0.935** 
 (2.717) (1.729) (2.466) 
Rt3 -0.044 -0.094*** -0.081*** 
 (-1.152) (-3.013) (-4.686) 
NGt 0.090 0.181*** 0.050 
 (1.427) (3.946) (1.359) 
NGt*Xt-1 -0.574 0.385 -0.110 
 (-1.510) (1.513) (-0.506) 
NGt*Xt 0.545 -0.047 0.609* 
 (0.741) (-0.117) (1.886) 
NGt*Xt3 -0.025 -0.525*** -0.510** 
 (-0.105) (-2.590) (-2.563) 
NGt*Rt3 -0.155*** 0.013 0.036 
 (-2.620) (0.229) (0.776) 
Controls Included Included Included 
Year & Industry FE Included Included Included 
Adjusted R2 0.309 0.363 0.331 
Observations 1,526 1,726 1,968 
This table provides the results from estimating Model (3) using a propensity score 
matched sample based on the propensity to have larger non-GAAP exclusions. NG, 
as well as all control variables are within industry-year fractional rankings that range 
from 0 to 1.  T-statistics based on standard errors clustered by firm are presented 
below each coefficient. See Appendix for variable definitions. ***, **, and * indicate 
two-tailed p-values less than 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1, respectively.   
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Panel D: Income-Increasing & Income-Decreasing Non-GAAP Exclusions 
Rt = β0 + β1Xt-1 + β2Xt + β3Xt3 + β4Rt3 + β5NGt+ + β6NGt+*Xt-1 + β7NGt+*Xt + β8NGt+*Xt3  
+ β9NGt+*Rt3 + β5NGt – + β6NGt -*Xt-1 + β7NGt -*Xt + β8NGt -*Xt3 + β9NGt -*Rt3  
+ γnControls + δnControls*Xt3 + εt (4) 
 
  NGt = NGTotal NGt = NGRecur NGt = NGIncr 
Intercept -0.206 0.102 -0.186 
 (-1.512) (0.789) (-1.339) 
Xt-1 -0.052 -0.601*** -0.226 
 (-0.243) (-3.662) (-1.582) 
Xt -0.075 0.668*** 0.273** 
 (-0.140) (3.419) (1.999) 
Xt3 1.367*** 0.612 0.941** 
 (3.343) (1.466) (2.512) 
Rt3 -0.060 -0.091*** -0.080*** 
 (-1.555) (-2.903) (-4.565) 
NGt
+
 0.136** 0.231*** 0.086* 
 (2.018) (4.418) (1.872) 
NGt
+*Xt-1 -0.535 0.152 -0.045 
 (-1.424) (0.538) (-0.132) 
NGt
+*Xt 0.696 0.549 0.807* 
 (0.931) (1.088) (1.850) 
NGt+*Xt3 -0.319 -0.591** -0.713*** 
 (-1.247) (-2.468) (-2.941) 
NGt
+*Rt3 -0.105* -0.014 0.041 
 (-1.670) (-0.231) (0.716) 
NGt 
-
 -0.096 0.048 -0.033 
 (-1.049) (0.811) (-0.765) 
NGt 
-*Xt-1 -0.667 1.150*** 0.002 
 (-1.105) (2.807) (0.012) 
NGt 
-*Xt 0.883 -0.375 0.006 
 (0.868) (-0.806) (0.017) 
NGt -*Xt3 0.428 -0.317 -0.036 
 (1.633) (-1.345) (-0.192) 
NGt 
-*Rt3 -0.162** 0.026 -0.003 
 (-2.285) (0.375) (-0.079) 
Controls Included Included Included 
Year & Industry FE Included Included Included 
Adjusted R2 0.317 0.369 0.335 
Observations 1,526 1,726 1,968 
This table provides the results from estimating Model (4) using a propensity score matched sample 
based on the propensity to have larger non-GAAP exclusions.  NG, as well as all control variables are 
within industry-year fractional rankings that range from 0 to 1.  T-statistics based on standard errors 
clustered by firm are presented below each coefficient.  See Appendix for variable definitions. ***, 
**, and * indicate two-tailed p-values less than 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1, respectively.   
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Table 8 – Consistent Non-GAAP Reporters 
  NGt = NGRecur NGt = NGIncr NGt = NGIncr 
Xt-1 -0.380*** -0.409*** -0.530*** -0.342*** 
 (-6.960) (-3.163) (-4.354) (-4.643) 
Xt 0.517*** 0.724*** 0.671*** 0.543*** 
 (7.027) (2.775) (5.714) (6.150) 
Xt3 0.584** 0.793*** 0.669*** 0.702*** 
 (2.253) (3.425) (2.720) (2.709) 
Rt3 -0.086*** -0.088*** -0.099*** -0.094*** 
 (-8.217) (-4.503) (-6.022) (-7.690) 
CONSISTENTt -0.034** 0.033 0.003 -0.008 
 (-2.528) (1.230) (0.152) (-0.450) 
CONSISTENTt*Xt-1 -0.073 -0.068 -0.079 -0.185 
 (-0.718) (-0.351) (-0.433) (-1.541) 
CONSISTENTt*Xt 0.033 -0.335 -0.208 -0.063 
 (0.292) (-0.949) (-1.115) (-0.456) 
CONSISTENTt*Xt3 0.195** 0.101 0.181 0.077 
 (2.459) (0.771) (1.541) (0.779) 
CONSISTENTt*Rt3 -0.034* -0.008 -0.047* -0.018 
 
(-1.924) (-0.274) (-1.816) (-0.922) 
NGt 
 
0.118*** 0.098*** 0.040* 
 
 
(4.226) (4.269) (1.852) 
NGt*Xt-1 
 
0.044 0.255 -0.125 
 
 
(0.238) (1.521) (-0.904) 
NGt*Xt 
 
-0.348 -0.400* -0.092 
 
 
(-0.945) (-1.686) (-0.461) 
NGt*Xt3 
 
-0.279** -0.169 -0.289*** 
 
 
(-2.218) (-1.566) (-2.599) 
NGt*Rt3 
 
-0.000 0.017 0.029 
 
 
(-0.008) (0.637) (1.068) 
CONSISTENTt*NGt 
 
-0.102** -0.065* -0.079** 
 
 
(-2.331) (-1.734) (-2.031) 
CONSISTENTt*NGt*Xt-1 
 
0.066 0.036 0.314 
 
 
(0.200) (0.130) (1.218) 
CONSISTENTt*NGt*Xt 
 
0.544 0.608 0.678* 
 
 
(1.052) (1.577) (1.700) 
CONSISTENTt*NGt*Xt3 
 
0.062 -0.042 0.341# 
 
 
(0.268) (-0.202) (1.574) 
CONSISTENTt*NGt*Rt3 
 
-0.059 0.044 -0.072 
 
 
(-1.137) (0.912) (-1.545) 
Controls Included Included Included Included 
Year & Industry FE Included Included Included Included 
Adjusted R2 0.333 0.337 0.337 0.337 
Observations 7,010 7,010 7,010 7,010 
This table provides results for firms that consistently disclose non-GAAP EPS.  Standard errors are 
clustered by firm.  See Appendix for variable definitions. ***, **, and * indicate two-tailed p-values 
less than 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1. # indicates one-tailed p-value less than 0.1. 
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Figure 1: Non-GAAP Exclusions 
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EPSStreet: IBES Actual EPS 
(“Street Earnings”) 
EPSOP: EPS from Operations 
(OPREPSX) 
EPSGAAP: EPS before  
Extraordinary Items 
(EPSFX) 
EPSBL: Bottom-line EPS 
 (EPSFI) 
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Figure 2: Non-GAAP Earnings & Exclusions Over Time 
 
 
Panel A: This graph presents the percentage of firms from the intersection of Compustat, 




Panel B: This graph presents the average magnitude of non-GAAP exclusions each year, 
with exclusions per share scaled by GAAP earnings per share.  Total, recurring and 
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Appendix B: Variable Definitions 
EPSGAAP GAAP earnings per share before extraordinary items (EPSFX). 
EPSOP GAAP earnings per share from operations (OPREPSX). 
EPSStreet Analyst-adjusted “street earnings” per share (IBES Actual EPS). 
EPSNonGAAP Manager-adjusted non-GAAP earnings per share disclosed in the fourth 
quarter earnings announcement press release. 
Rt 12-month stock return over the fiscal year t. 
Xt-1 Earnings per share (EPSFX, adjusted for stock splits and stock 
dividends) in year t-1, scaled by stock price at the beginning of year t. 
Xt Earnings per share (EPSFX, adjusted for stock splits and stock 
dividends) in year t, scaled by stock price at the beginning of the year t. 
Xt3 Sum of earnings per share (EPSFX, adjusted for stock splits and stock 
dividends) in years t+1, t+2 and t+3, scaled by stock price at the 
beginning of year t. 
Rt3 Annually compounded stock return for years t+1 through t+3.  
EXCLTotal Total non-GAAP exclusions, calculated as EPSNonGAAP minus EPSGAAP. 
EXCLRecur Recurring item exclusions, calculated as EPSNonGAAP minus EPSOP. 
EXCLIncr Managers’ incremental exclusions, calculated as EPSNonGAAP minus 
EPSStreet. 
NGTotal Within industry-year fractional ranking of the magnitude of a firm’s 
total non-GAAP exclusions (EXCLTotal ).  Values range from 0 to 1 with 
0 representing observations with the smallest differences (positive or 
negative) between GAAP EPS and non-GAAP EPS in each industry-
year and 1 representing observations with the largest differences. 
EXCLTotal is scaled by abs(EPSGAAP) before ranking. 
NGRecur Within industry-year fractional ranking of the magnitude of a firm’s 
exclusion of recurring items (EXCLRecur /GAAP EPS).  Values range 
from 0 to 1 with 0 representing observations with the smallest 
differences (positive or negative) between GAAP EPS from operations 
and non-GAAP EPS in each industry-year and 1 representing 
observations with the largest differences. EXCLRecur is scaled by 
abs(EPSGAAP) before ranking. 
NGIncr Within industry-year fractional ranking of the magnitude of a firm’s 
incremental non-GAAP exclusions (EXCLIncr /GAAP EPS).  Values 
range from 0 to 1 with 0 representing observations with the smallest 
differences (positive or negative) between the analyst-adjusted IBES 
Actual EPS and non-GAAP EPS in each industry-year and 1 
representing observations with the largest differences. EXCLIncr is scaled 
by abs(EPSGAAP) before ranking. 
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PROFITt = 1 (0 otherwise) if EPSNonGAAP is zero or positive while EPSOP is 
negative. 
MEETt = 1 (0 otherwise) if EPSNonGAAP meets or exceeds the consensus 
analyst forecast while EPSStreet does not. 
JUSTMEETt = 1 (0 otherwise) if EPSNonGAAP meets or exceeds the consensus 
analyst forecast by $0.02 or less while EPSStreet does not. 
CONSISTENT =1 (0 otherwise) for firms that have at least one year where EPS-
NonGAAP is equal to EPSGAAP. 
LAG_NONGAAPt =1 (0 otherwise) if the firm disclosed EPSNonGAAP in year t-1. 
MISSt =1 (0 otherwise) if EPSOP is less than the consensus analyst 
forecast in year t. 
LOSSt =1 (0 otherwise) if EPSOP is negative in year t. 
SIZEt Natural log of total assets (AT) at the beginning of year t. 
STDROAt Standard deviation of earnings before extraordinary items and 
discontinued operations scaled by total assets (IB/AT) over the 
sample period. 
NUMANALYSTSt Natural log of one plus the number of analysts following the firm 
in year t. 
LEVERAGEt Ratio of total debt (DLC+DLTT) to total assets (AT) in year t. 
BTMt Book-to-market ratio, calculated as the ratio of book value of 
equity to market value of equity (CEQ/(PRCC_F*CSHO)) at the 
beginning of year t. 
SPECIALt Special items (SPI), scaled by total assets (AT) at the beginning 
of year t. 
INTANt Level of intangible assets (INTAN), scaled by total assets (AT) 
at the beginning of year t. 
UPEARNt =1 (0 otherwise) if earnings before extraordinary items (IB) in 
year t is greater than earnings before extraordinary items in year 
t-1. 
HI_EXCLTotal =1 (0 otherwise) if EXCLTotal is above the industry median in 
year t. 
HI_EXCLRecur =1 (0 otherwise) if EXCLRecur is above the industry median in 
year t. 
HI_EXCLIncr =1 (0 otherwise) if EXCLIncr is above the industry median in year 
t. 
 
